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Delaware as Deal Arbiter
Christina M. Sautter ∗
Abstract
Most would agree that the Delaware courts are the leading
jurists in the resolution of corporate conflicts, particularly in the
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) context. Arguably a greater role
that Delaware plays is that of a norm setter, both with respect to
the expectations of management conduct in the M&A process and
with respect to deal terms, particularly deal protection devices.
Like in any relationship, there is a “give and take” between
practitioners and Delaware. That is, practitioners are “on the
front lines,” often innovating with respect to new deal structures
and deal terms. After some time, Delaware has the opportunity
to review these innovations. As the Delaware courts render
decisions, they comment on behavior in the deal process and on
the legality of contractual provisions. In turn, practitioners take
heed. They not only comply with these deal norms but, at least in
the context of deal protection devices, they slowly push the
boundaries. Delaware tends not to take issue with this boundary
pushing as practitioners are largely complying with deal norms.
This Article examines this relationship between practitioners
and Delaware and argues that this circular effect has had the
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result of eroding the very enhanced scrutiny standards which the
courts have announced.
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Introduction

arbiter
n. a person or force that settles a dispute or has ultimate
authority in a matter . . . . (usu. arbiter of) someone whose
views or actions have great influence over trends in social
behavior: an arbiter of taste
—The Oxford Dictionary of Difficult Words 1

There is no question that judges and the courts are
considered the epitome of arbiters. The Delaware Supreme
Court and Delaware Court of Chancery are no exception with
many considering the Delaware courts the ultimate arbiters of
corporate law. 2 The uniqueness of Delaware courts and their
expertise in the resolution of transactional law disputes,
particularly arising from Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) deals,

1. Arbiter, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF DIFFICULT WORDS 29 (OXFORD
UNIV. PRESS 2004).
2. See Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation
Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771, 771–72 (2009)
Delaware’s courts offer litigants a forum with an extensive and
well-developed jurisprudence that creates predictability and
expediency in adjudication, allowing for efficient business planning.
Delaware’s independent judiciary is essential to securing these
values, and its practice of appointing judges and maintaining a
balance of power between political parties on its high court has
yielded dividends in both the expertise and independence of its
judiciary.
See also William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW.
351, 354 (1992)
In light of its 200 year history, the Delaware Court of Chancery
deserves our celebration, not only as a unique and vibrant Delaware
institution, but as an important contributor to our national system
of justice. The Delaware state court system has established its
national preeminence in the field of corporation law due in large
measure to its Court of Chancery.
Joseph R. Slights III & Elizabeth A. Powers, Delaware Courts Continue to
Excel in Business Litigation with the Success of the Complex Commercial
Litigation Division of the Superior Court, 70 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1039 (2015)
(“Over its more than two-hundred-year history, Delaware’s Court of Chancery
has emerged as the world’s most respected forum for adjudicating highly
complex business disputes.”).
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has been well documented. 3 However, the Delaware courts’ role
in M&A goes well beyond having the final “power to decide
disputes” arising from these transactions. 4 The judicial opinions
rendered by the Delaware courts have not only announced
intermediate and enhanced scrutiny standards but, possibly
more importantly, have strongly hinted at the types of conduct
which may or may not be acceptable in the negotiation of a
transaction. 5 As a result, Delaware 6 has strongly influenced
both the behavior of dealmakers 7 as well as the contractual
provisions to which dealmakers agree. In other words, Delaware
is an arbiter in every sense of the word—it is not only settling
disputes but also setting deal norms.
In setting deal norms, there is a “give and take” relationship
between dealmakers and Delaware. 8 That is, practitioners are
“on the front lines,” often innovating with respect to new deal
structures and deal terms. After some time, Delaware has the
3. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive
Reach, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 92, 96 (2012) (concluding through empirical
analysis that Delaware dominates the law and adjudication of merger
agreements in economically significant transactions); John C. Coates, IV &
John F. Cogan, Jr., Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from
M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295, 298 (2012) (finding that Delaware dominates
as the choice of forum in M&A agreements involving publicly traded
companies); Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out
of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 774 (2013) (explaining that
recent studies have found that Delaware dominates as the choice of forum in
M&A agreements).
4. Arbiter, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2019).
5. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of these opinions.
6. Throughout this Article, Delaware will be used to refer generally to
the Delaware courts, specifically the Delaware Supreme Court and the
Delaware Court of Chancery.
7. For purposes of this Article, the term “dealmaker” will generally refer
to those individuals largely responsible for the negotiation of M&A
transactions, particularly the attorneys who are tasked with advising
management, structuring the transaction, and drafting the ultimate deal
terms.
8. See James D. Cox, How Understanding the Nature of Corporate
Norms Can Prevent Their Destruction by Settlements, 66 DUKE L.J. 501, 513
(2016) (“The court’s conclusions, which usually follow a narrative for the
corporate actors’ behavior, signal what practices are acceptable and
unacceptable, and communicate the norms that are indeed shared by others
in the belief group.”).
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opportunity to review these innovations. As the Delaware courts
render decisions, they comment on behavior in the deal process
and on the legality of contractual provisions. 9 In turn,
practitioners take heed. They not only comply with these deal
norms but, at least in the context of deal protection devices, they
slowly push the boundaries. Delaware tends not to take issue
with this boundary pushing as practitioners are largely
complying with deal norms. But the circular effect of this
symbiotic relationship has had the result of eroding the very
enhanced scrutiny standards which the courts have announced.
This Article begins to track the effect that Delaware courts
have had on dealmaking since the 1980s. In particular, this
Article argues that, although the Delaware courts have
announced enhanced or stricter scrutiny standards in the
context of many mergers and acquisitions, in application the
courts have evolved to a general reasonableness standard. 10
Instead of enforcing enhanced standards, the courts utilize their
opinions to signal best practices in dealmaking. 11 Practitioners
have responded by operating pursuant to a set of norms in both
the deal process and the deal terms. Generally, as long as deals
reflect these norms, the courts will uphold the transactions and
deal terms as reasonable. 12
Part II of this Article will examine social norms in the
corporate context and describes the differences between
obligational and nonobligational norms. Part III of this Article
will recap the deal environment in the 1970s and 1980s prior to
Delaware’s announcement of enhanced scrutiny standards in
the M&A context. In addition, this section will briefly examine
the business and legal communities’ reactions to leveraged
buyouts, management-led buyouts, and hostile takeovers. Part
IV of this Article will summarize Delaware case law announcing
enhanced scrutiny standards. Perhaps more importantly, this
Part will also discuss the norms the Delaware courts developed
in announcing these enhanced scrutiny standards and will
9. See id. (commenting that judicial opinions provide a “mechanism by
which corporate actors receive social cues”).
10. See infra Parts V.A., V.B.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See infra Parts IV.B., V.A., V.B.
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examine dealmakers’ reaction to these standards. Then Part V
will briefly review the progeny of this case law to demonstrate
how the Delaware courts have moved to a general
reasonableness standard which, in turn, has permitted
dealmakers to adopt more intricate and more severe deal
protection devices.
II.

Corporate Norms

As an arbiter, one of Delaware’s greatest contributions to
M&A dealmaking has been Delaware’s ability to “influence
social behavior” in dealmaking. 13 That is, over the past three
decades, Delaware has developed a comprehensive set of norms
which attorneys have utilized in advising boards regarding
fiduciary duties and in negotiating deal terms, particularly deal
protection devices. 14 In describing the role of courts in resolving
corporate disputes generally, Professor James Cox describes
courts as “norm engineers.” 15 He compares judicial opinions to
“sermon[s] on the good, the bad, and the ugly.” 16 These sermons
convey a set of norms which become perpetuated through
constant dealmaking. Prior to tackling the development of these
dealmaking norms, however, I must first address the structure
of social norms generally in corporate law. This Article will
follow Professor Melvin Eisenberg’s social norm framework
which breaks norms down into obligational social norms and
nonobligational social norms. 17
13. Arbiter, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF DIFFICULT WORDS 29 (OXFORD
UNIV. PRESS 2004).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. Cox, supra note 8, at 514.
16. Id.
17. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1257–62 (1999) (characterizing norms as obligational or
nonobligational). Other corporate law scholars have used differing
terminology for norms. For example, Professor Cox divides corporate norms
into aspirational norms and arbiter norms. Cox, supra note 8, at 514–21. He
provides the business judgment rule and the materiality standard as examples
of aspirational norms as they “exist because they are believed to best serve
societal objectives.” Id. at 519. On the other hand, arbiter norms “serve a quite
different purpose: providing a party with a means to involve a court and
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Obligational Social Norms

Obligational social norms are practices that individuals feel
required to obey even though the practice is not a legally
enforceable rule. 18 To determine whether a norm is obligational
in nature, one may examine “whether a departure from the
norm is likely to involve either self-criticism or criticism by
others.” 19 In Eisenberg’s framework, obligational norms further
break down into internalized obligational norms and
noninternalized social norms. 20
Just as the term suggests, internalized obligational norms
are norms that individuals have internalized. 21 In other words,
these are norms that become a part of one’s character and
prevent an individual from engaging in certain behavior or
cause the individual to take some action. 22 As Eisenberg says,
some things are “simply not done” while others are “simply
done.” 23 For example, moral norms are internalized obligational
norms but internalized obligational norms are not confined to
just moral norms. 24 Although, internalized obligational norms
also “shape an actor’s social character.” 25 Eisenberg provides the
example of not picking pockets as an internalized moral norm
thereby obtain an impartial assessment of distinct transactions.” Id. Cox uses
the Revlon doctrine as an example of an arbiter norm. Id. at 519–20. The
Revlon doctrine as a norm will be discussed more in Part IV.B.3 of the Article.
In contrast, Professors Edward Rock and Michael L. Wachter utilized the term
“nonlegally enforceable rules and standards” in their 2001 article exploring
corporate norms. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1619, 1641 (2001) (defining “nonlegally enforceable rules and
standards”).
18. See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1257 (discussing the different
categories of social norms).
19. Id.
20. See id. at 1258–61 (comparing internalized norms to noninternalized
norms).
21. Id. at 1258–59.
22. See id. (explaining that some norms prevent actions even when an
individual would obtain some benefit from taking the benefit and some norms
encourage some actions).
23. Id. at 1259.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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while dressing formally for the opening night of the
Metropolitan Opera would be an internalized obligational norm
that is not moral in nature. 26
Whether a party complies with a noninternalized
obligational norm is a result of a cost-benefit analysis resulting
from noncompliance. 27 More specifically, individuals will weigh
the costs resulting from nonadherence, which may include “loss
of reputation, including diminished esteem, public shame (as
opposed to feeling ashamed), and disdain.” 28 An individual will
compare these costs to the benefits of adherence, which may
include “enhanced reputation, including increased esteem,
public recognition, and social acceptance.” 29 Despite these
differences between internalized and noninternalized
obligational norms, Eisenberg argues that in order for a norm to
persist, enough individuals in a group must ultimately
internalize the norm. 30
B.

Nonobligational Social Norms

Nonobligational social norms represent practices that
someone “ought” to do. 31 Eisenberg describes these as
“behavioral patterns or practices” which either may or may not
be “self-consciously adhered to” but which are not obligational
in nature. 32 Nonobligational norms include patterns of conduct
or certain routines, such as taking vitamins each morning. 33
They further include certain usages in language. 34 For example,
with respect to the usage of terms in language, in the context of
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1260.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1261.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1256.
33. Id.
34. Id. Eisenberg provides an example from the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, which explains that “San Domingo mahogany” is a term used in the
mahogany industry to describe high quality mahogany of a “certain density.”
Id. However, San Domingo mahogany does not come from San Domingo. Id.
Hence, the use of the term is a nonobligational norm. Id. at 1256–57.
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deal protection devices, we refer to provisions prohibiting
companies from actively soliciting, negotiating with, and
providing information to third parties unless a target board’s
fiduciary duties so require as no shop provisions. 35 But as a
technical matter, these contractual clauses include several
different provisions: no shops (the anti-solicitation portion); no
talks (the anti-negotiation and provision of information
portion); and fiduciary outs (the portion allowing for
negotiations if a board’s fiduciary duties would so provide). 36
Through the repeated use of the term “no shop provision,”
dealmakers know that they are referring to not just
anti-solicitation clauses but also to the no talk and fiduciary out
clauses which virtually always appear with anti-solicitation
clauses. Hence, using the term “no shop provision” is a
nonobligational norm.
Eisenberg has noted that most legal and economics scholars
have focused almost exclusively on obligational norms. 37 But, by
focusing so narrowly on obligational norms, he argues that
scholars miss the impact that nonobligational norms have on
allowing certain behavior to take place. 38 More specifically,
35. See, e.g., No-Shops and Their Exceptions, THOMSON REUTERS:
PRACTICAL LAW (referring to covenants preventing the solicitation of other
bids, the provision of information to other bidders, and the negotiation with
other bidders as no shops) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours:
From No Shops to Go-Shops—the Development, Effectiveness, and
Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 525, 534–35 (2008) (explaining the technical differences
between no shops and no talks and further explaining the role of fiduciary
outs). Even more technically, a no shop provision paired with a fiduciary out
is a window shop provision. Id. at 534. As I have described in a previous article,
fiduciary out provisions may be drafted broadly like the one in the text which
allows action when a board’s fiduciary duties would require it. See Christina
M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 55, 80–83 (2010) (describing broad fiduciary outs in the context of a
board’s recommendation to the shareholders). But they also can be drafted
more narrowly and allow action if there is a superior offer or an intervening
event or even more narrowly and allow action only if there is a superior offer.
See id. at 83–87 (describing narrower fiduciary outs).
37. See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1261 (comparing obligational norms
to legal rules).
38. See id. at 1262 (providing different examples to show the effect
nonobligational norms have on behavior).
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certain patterns of behavior become socially permissible
because of the prevalence of that behavior. 39 Finally, although
social norms may be divided into obligational and
nonobligational, norms are not necessarily so easily classifiable.
That is, many norms could be both obligational and
nonobligational in nature. 40 To explain these two types of
norms, Eisenberg used the example of the hand signal used to
hitchhike. 41 The usage of such a hand signal is a nonobligational
norm. 42 However, if a hitchhiker finds that they are unable to
obtain rides without using the same hand signal, the hitchhiker
would then feel obligated to use the signal. 43
III. Deal Environment Prior to Enhanced Scrutiny Cases
To better understand the norms developed by Delaware, I
am going to first recap the deal environment leading up to some
of the most significant cases in M&A. These cases not only
announced more enhanced levels of scrutiny but also set forth
fundamental norms for dealmakers. Delaware developed these
norms largely in reaction to the 1970s and early 1980s deal
environment, which saw an abundance of transactions utilizing
new deal forms.
A.

The Late 1970s and Early 1980s Deal Environment

The late 1970s and early 1980s were marked by the
development of leveraged buyouts (LBOs), management-led
buyouts (MBOs), and hostile transactions. 44 When speaking of
39. See id. (“[I]f smoking is a prevailing practice, it will be socially
permissible.”).
40. Id. (indicating that failure to follow established nonobligational
practices “will be treated as a defeat of justified expectations,” transforming
practices into obligations).
41. Id. at 1257.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1261–62.
44. See MICHELLE R. GARFINKEL, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 23 (1989), https://
perma.cc/5SF7-JURQ (PDF) (noting the increasing popularity of LBOs
between 1979 and 1989); Joseph J. Allerhand & Bradley R. Aronstam, New
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LBOs and MBOs during this period, many commentators
attempted to distinguish between the two forms of
transactions. 45 As these commentators noted, there is no clear
definition for these different transactions and, many times,
there may be no difference between an LBO and an MBO. 46 In
a general sense, an LBO is the purchase of a target company (a
standalone company or a subsidiary or division of another
company) using a significant amount of debt financing (as much
as 60 to 90 percent ). 47 The assets of the acquired company are
used to secure the debt so that following the purchase, the
acquired company is highly leveraged. 48 In a typical LBO, the
target’s equity is owned by a smaller number of shareholders
following the acquisition. 49 Going-private transactions, in which
a publicly traded company is purchased using a significant
amount of debt financing is a typical LBO. 50 Between 1979 and
1985 there were 246 going-private transactions representing a
total dollar value of almost $49 billion. 51 More generally, during
Wave of M&A Litigation Attacks Private Equity Deals, 238 N.Y.L. J. 9, 9 (2007)
(“[M]erger and acquisition activity in the 1980s was epitomized by hostile
takeovers and the ‘omnipresent specter’ of entrenched managed . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at 23–24 (describing the
ambiguous nature of LBOs).
46. See id. at 23 (“[T]here does not appear to be a single, clear definition
of what an LBO really is.”).
47. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form Over Substance?
The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 849, 855 (2011) (stating that debt financing accounts for 60 to 90 percent of
financing); GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at 24 (stating that debt financing
accounts for 80 to 90 percent of the funding for an LBO); JONATHAN
OLSEN, FOSTER CTR. FOR PRIV. EQUITY & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, NOTE ON
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 1 (2002), https://perma.cc/L3PH-PQTR (PDF) (describing
the general structure of LBOs).
48. See OLSEN, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that the acquired company
“generates cash flows which are used to service the debt incurred in its
buyout”).
49. See GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at 24 (reasoning that this is a
distinguishing factor from other takeover and merger activities).
50. See id. (“In essence, the transaction involves a substitution of debt for
equity.”).
51. See id. at 25 (presenting a table with LBO activity each year from
1979 to 1988). The transaction and dollar value totals were achieved by adding
the numbers for each year from 1979 to 1985. Id. As for total LBO activity
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the 1980s, LBOs accounted for 24.5 percent of all acquisitions. 52
With numbers like these, there is no question that LBOs came
to dominate the takeover market in the 1980s.
In addition to LBOs, MBOs also became popular. MBOs are
LBOs in which management of the target company is part of the
buyout group and will have an equity stake in the target
company post-closing. 53 As a result of management’s
participation in the acquisition, MBOs carry a high potential for
conflicts of interest. 54 MBOs are a subset of LBOs. 55 Although
technically not all LBOs are also MBOs, LBOs do still carry a
risk of a conflicted board of directors. 56 This risk arises mainly
from the fact that management tend to keep their positions
following an LBO. 57

(including MBOs), one study provides there were 903 between 1981 and 1985
(the year in which the first Delaware case addressed LBOs) and there were
2,497 LBOs between 1981 and 1990. See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID
SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE
CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 23 (1998) (displaying a chart containing
number of LBOs in the United States).
52. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 47, at 855.
53. See id. at 857 (describing an MBO as a transaction in which
“[m]anagement, either alone or with another acquisition group, would acquire
a company under their control by arranging debt financing in leverage ranges
equivalent to an LBO”); Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process Design in
Management Buyouts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 591 (2016) (indicating that
senior managers of a target company have a buy-side interest in MBOs).
54. See Subramanian, supra note 53, at 591 (“MBOs are conflict
transactions because senior managers have a fiduciary duty to maximize value
for sell-side shareholders but also have buy-side interest.”).
55. See Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730,
782 (1985) (recognizing the “definitional problem” in differentiating LBOs and
MBOs and stating “not all leveraged buyouts are management buyouts”).
56. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Law, Ethics, and the Leveraged Buyout, 65
U. DET. L. REV. 403, 406–07 (1988) (describing fiduciary duty concerns with
LBOs).
57. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 108, 114 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (addressing conflict of interest in a LBO where the buyer entered
into employment agreements with several officers and directors to retain
positions post-closing); In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 82 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (addressing a claim that existing management favored LBO buyer
because it would allow management to retain their positions).
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Not only did leveraged buyouts grow in the 1980s, but so
did hostile transactions. 58 One third of deals valued at $1
million or more in the 1980s were hostile transactions. 59 One
study revealed that of the eighty-two acquisitions of Fortune
500 companies which occurred between 1981 and 1985, almost
half, or forty, “appear to have started out as hostile.” 60 Many of
these hostile transactions were highly leveraged, similar to
LBOs and MBOs. 61
The LBOs, MBOs, and hostile transactions which came to
dominate the 1980s arose in response to the 1960s conglomerate
merger wave. 62 During that period, “[e]xecutives filled boards of
directors with subordinates and friendly ‘outsiders’ and engaged
in rampant empire building. The ranks of middle management
swelled and corporate profitability began to slide.” 63 This was
the perfect environment for highly leveraged deals and hostile
transactions to take hold in order to “restructure” companies. 64
While earlier generations of managers were not open to using
debt as a form of financing, this began to change in the late
1970s and early 1980s. 65 At the same time, private equity firms
like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts were formed to engage in LBOs of
inefficient, underperforming companies. 66 Following an LBO,
58. Robert B. Reich, Leveraged Buyouts: America Pays the Price, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1989, at 32.
59. Id.
60. Randall Mørck, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Characteristics
of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 102 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
61. See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 3 (3d ed. 2002) (noting “highly leveraged transactions that
were common in the 1980s”).
62. See Timothy M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories
on The Rise of Conglomerate Mergers in the 1960s, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 185,
185 (2006) (stating the conglomerate merger wave “began quietly in the years
following World War II and reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s”).
63. OLSEN, supra note 47, at 2.
64. See BAKER & SMITH, supra note 51, at 4 (stating that the merger wave
of the 1980s was a response to “management suffering from luxuriant
decadence”).
65. See OLSEN, supra note 47, at 2 (stating that the new generation of
management in the late 1970s was willing to use debt financing).
66. See id. (noting that many public companies were trading at a discount
to net asset value at the time).
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many acquired companies were broken up and sold off in pieces
for a profit. 67
Like LBOs and MBOs, hostile transactions also were used
to dismantle conglomerates in the 1980s. However, unlike LBOs
and MBOs, hostile transactions, or at least hostile cash tender
offers, first arose in the early 1960s. 68 When they first arose,
hostile cash tender offers often did not actually result in a
liquidation of the target company’s assets. 69 Instead,
dealmakers used them as a way of quickly purchasing
companies and building conglomerates. 70 But, during the 1980s,
many bidders engaged in hostile acquisitions with the end goal
of selling off portions, or all, of the target company. 71 Or, at least
that was the perception that many had of the corporate raiders
who had come to symbolize the 1980s. 72

67. See id. (explaining that “[t]his ‘bust-up’ approach” characterized early
LBOs). In addition, LBOs also included acquisitions of unrelated divisions or
subsidiaries of conglomerates, which were being spun off in order for the
company to acquire companies in a related line of business. See Leslie Wayne,
Buyouts Altering Face of Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1985, at A1
(attributing this new approach to regulatory changes from the Reagan
administration).
68. For a detailed description of the growth of hostile cash tender offers,
see Christina M. Sautter, Tender Offers and Disclosure: The History and
Future of the Williams Act, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 354 (Claire Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016).
69. See Samuel L. Hayes, III & Russell A. Taussig, Tactics of Cash
Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. BUS. REV. 135, 138 (1967) (presenting results of a
study conducted in the 1960s which revealed that “two thirds of the acquiring
firms retained at least 75% of the purchased assets five years after completion
of the mergers”).
70. See Sautter, Tender Offers and Disclosure, supra note 68, at 356–58
(describing the use of cash tender offers as a way of obtaining control).
71. See Mørck, et al., supra note 60, at 104 (“Bidders in hostile
transactions may be more interested in shutting down, selling off, or
redepreciating the physical capital of the target than they are in continuing
business as usual.”).
72. See Delaware Bench, Bar Celebrate 225-Year-Old Chancery Court’s
Evolution, 32 No. 7 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. 3, *1 (2017) (quoting Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz partner, Theodore Mirvis, as stating “[m]ost of the
litigation of the 1970s and ‘80s involved such corporate raiders wanting to
acquire control of companies so they could carve them up and sell off the pieces
at a quick profit”).
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Reactions to LBOs, MBOs, and Hostile Transactions

Despite their popularity, the LBOs, MBOs, and hostile
transactions which came to dominate the 1980s were met with
mixed reactions from financial and business communities, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and academics. 73
Criticisms ranged from concerns regarding impact on the target
company, including debt burdens, to concerns about the
conflicts of interests inherent in many of the transactions.
With respect to leveraged transactions, many were
concerned with the amount of debt incurred by the target
company. For example, in 1984, John S. R. Shad, the
then-Chairman of the SEC, warned that bankruptcies may
increase as a result of LBOs, MBOs, and leveraged takeovers. 74
He pointed out that significant past bankruptcies had occurred
as a result of taking on a large amount of debt to finance
“aggressive takeover problems.” 75 Further, he explained that
when a company has limited cash flow, “even modest business
problems” become magnified. 76
An additional significant concern with leveraged buyouts,
particularly MBOs, was potential conflicts of interests on the
part of boards in evaluating such transactions. Unlike with
traditional transactions, LBOs raise a particular set of issues
for boards. 77 Boards had to consider the timing needed to
arrange financing and to fully negotiate all interests in the
transaction. 78 This could take between 90 and 120 days longer
73. See, e.g., Fred R. Bleakley, S.E.C. Chief Cautions on Leveraged
Buyouts, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1984, at D1 (noting that the SEC Chief “pointed
out that . . . major past bankruptcies . . . had resulted from heavy debt
incurred by aggressive takeover programs”); GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at
26– 28 (referencing the concern that “LBO transaction[s] have no positive real
effects on [a] firm’s output,” but rebutting those concerns by giving evidence
that “LBOs can be productive”).
74. See Bleakley, supra note 73, at D1 (explaining that leveraged buyouts
“will magnify the adverse consequences of the next recession or significant rise
in interest rates”).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Carl Ferech, Leveraged Buyouts and the Board, 9 DIRS. & BDS.,
45, 46 (1984) (explaining concerns specific to LBOs).
78. Id.
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than in a traditional transaction. 79 Because of the time required,
the company was then subject to a fair amount of uncertainty
from various constituencies and the possibility that the
company may receive other bids. 80
With any transaction, price is generally the most significant
consideration. However, with LBOs and MBOs, what a group
can pay is subject to “clear limitations,” including financing,
whether the price is competitive, what bankers may consider to
be fair, and the group’s “own requirements for a rate of
return.” 81 Inherent in all of these considerations are potential
conflicts for management. Obviously, when management is
involved in buying out the company, it is in the position to
“influence the transaction” on multiple levels. 82 Management
may act to try and prevent third parties who have previously
expressed an interest in purchasing the company from making
another offer. 83 Along these lines, the board of directors must
evaluate whether other offers should be solicited, which the
members of management who are part of the buyout group
would likely fight. 84 Practitioners recognized that because of
these numerous potential conflicts it would be very difficult for
management to remain objective. 85
With all of these concerns, the American Bar Association’s
Subcommittee of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law even
prepared guidelines for boards and management to follow in
going private transactions. 86 These guidelines included
considerations of fairness of the price being received, a
suggestion that outside shareholder votes should be considered
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Edward S. Smith, Getting to the Right Price: The CEO’s View of LBOs
and the Board, 9 DIRS. & BDS., 47, 47 (1984) (“[S]ince incumbent management
collectively end up as part owners of the newly formed business, it is
impossible for them to be entirely objective.”).
86. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines on Going Private, 37 BUS.
LAW. 313 (1981).
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separately from the insider votes (but would not be conclusive
regarding the outcome of the deal), obtaining expert opinions,
and using independent directors to negotiate. 87 These guidelines
and other similar practitioner commentary acted as a set of
norms before Delaware had an opportunity to review these
various new deal forms.
IV. Delaware’s Reaction to the “New” Deal
Environment—Setting Deal Norms
Although scholars have examined Delaware’s role in
developing corporate norms generally, most scholars have not
focused specifically on Delaware’s role in setting norms in M&A
deals. 88 This Part examines Delaware’s initial reactions to
leveraged transactions and hostile transactions. In reacting to
these transactions, Delaware is most well-known for
announcing new enhanced scrutiny standards. But in creating
these standards it also crafted a set of norms. As dealmakers
have responded to these norms, the norms themselves have
evolved.

87. See id. (promulgating guidelines).
88. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (arguing that corporate norms cannot be understood
without understanding trust behavior); Cox, supra note 8 (arguing that courts
should position settlements in the corporate norm which it wishes to uphold);
Eisenberg, supra note 17 (exploring corporate norms generally); Jill E. Fisch,
The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (arguing that Delaware courts attract
corporate charters and has developed a unique corporate lawmaking structure
and process); Holland, supra note 2 (arguing that Delaware courts act to set
norms through its jurisprudence that create “predictability and expediency in
adjudication”); Rehnquist, supra note 2 (arguing that Delaware sets norms
with its national superiority in corporate law); Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009
(1997) (exploring norms in the context of MBOs); Rock & Wachter, supra note
17 (arguing that corporations are governed mainly by norms which are not
legally enforceable); Slights III & Powers, supra note 2 (discussing Delaware’s
role as a leader in adjudicating corporate disputes).
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A.

What’s a Court to Do?

It was against the above described dealmaking backdrop in
the late 1970s and early 1980s that the Delaware courts finally
were able to respond in the mid-1980s. However, as Professor
Edward B. Rock describes in his famous article, Saint and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, which
examined norm-setting in the MBO context, there was a
significant lag time between the development and popularity of
MBOs and the Delaware cases reviewing them. 89 It is important
to note, as Professor Rock does, that when a new transactional
form (or provision) is at issue and is “rapidly developing,” courts
are unable to review the forms or provisions in “real time.” 90 As
such, the courts are left in the position of playing catch up.
When a court is playing catch up in the transactional law
context, it will likely be restricted in aggressively policing a
transaction structure or provision. 91 As Professor Rock
explained in the context of MBOs, by the time the Delaware
courts were able to review MBOs and provide standards,
dealmakers were already engaging in MBOs for over a decade
and had completed hundreds of transactions. 92 As such, the
Delaware courts were not able to declare MBOs per se illegal. 93
Of course, if Delaware had had the opportunity to review MBOs
earlier, it may not have declared the form illegal but it may have
tightened the rules earlier and possibly differently. However,
the lawyers had already been setting the “standards” for these

89.
See Rock, supra note 88, at 1095 (“Although MBOs of significant
publicly held companies, as a transactional form, got going seriously around
1981, the cases came so slowly that the defining trilogy of Macmillan, Fort
Howard, and RJR Nabisco was not written until 1988 and 1989.”).
90. Id.
91. See id. (describing the consequences of the time lag between deal
completion and judicial scrutiny).
92. See id. at 1096–97 (discussing the uncertainty of the law regarding
MBOs at this time and the number of deals completed before Delaware had
the opportunity to review MBOs).
93. See id. at 1097 (demonstrating how this lag in time “constrained
judicial decisionmaking”).
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deals in the absence of any judicial opinions on point. 94 They
were able to determine the structure, the typical merger
agreement provisions, and the appropriate level of management
oversight without judicial oversight. Hence, “what the business
lawyer [told] the clients—rather than what the judge
announce[d] to the world—is the law.” 95 So, as Professor Rock
argued, once the courts had the opportunity to review these
deals, the courts were “influenced and probably constrained” by
the deal lawyers’ standards. 96
This constraint echoes through judicial review of M&A not
just in the context of MBOs. This constraint is particularly
evident in the first Delaware Supreme Court case to review an
LBO, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 97 which will be discussed in more
detail in the next section. Because of the constraint that
Delaware uses, Delaware often speaks through dicta which
become deal norms. 98 In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, the constraint Delaware exercises in upholding
94. See id. (indicating that “[b]y doing these sorts of deals, in the absence
of controlling case law” lawyers played an integral role in shaping the legal
landscape with regard to MBOs).
95. Id. at 1096.
96. Id. at 1097. Of course, this issue is not limited to Delaware courts, as
all courts are interpreting laws not making them, and this interpretation often
occurs years after people have begun to rely upon whatever has become
commonplace practice relative to those laws.
97. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
98. Delaware regularly speaks through dicta in corporate law more
generally, not just in the M&A context. Two prime examples of Delaware’s use
of dicta are In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)
and In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996),
in which the courts addressed executive compensation and board oversight,
respectively. In these cases, the Delaware courts set expectations (i.e., norms)
for future board and executive behavior. See Mohsen Manesh, Damning
Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 58 (2013)
(“Disney’s judicially blessed ‘best practices,’ for instance, provided
not-so-subtle notice of the conduct that will be expected of corporate directors
in future lawsuits.”). These other areas of corporate law, however, do not
reflect the same “give and take” relationship that exists in M&A between
dealmakers and Delaware. This might be attributable to the M&A process
itself, the contractual nature of M&A, and Delaware’s recognition that boards
are in a better position to judge the merits of a merger than the courts are. Of
course, as is discussed in this Article, Delaware will step in if the court
determines there is a conflict or unfairness.
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board decisions and contractual provisions as long as they more
or less follow deal norms results in an overall erosion of
enhanced scrutiny standards.
B.

The Trifecta of Cases in 1985 Laying the Foundation for
Deal Norms

The Delaware Supreme Court seemed to come out of the
gate relatively strongly in reacting to the hostile transactions
and leveraged buyouts which had come to dominate the deal
landscape by the early 1980s. 99 In a set of three cases in 1985,
Delaware began to not only review hostile transactions and
leveraged buyouts but to attempt to formulate some meaningful
judicial review of M&A transactions. 100
1.

Smith v. Van Gorkom

The first case in 1985 was the Delaware Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 101 This controversial
decision was significant for a number of reasons, the least of
which being that it was the first decision in which the Delaware
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review an LBO. 102
99. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls and Professor Redux, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1037, 1046 (2002) (explaining that the decisions in Van Gorkom,
Unocal, Revlon, and Household “represented a set of compromises” in which
Delaware “chose a middle ground” rather than giving in to either corporate
raiders, advocating for takeover defenses to be outlawed, or corporate boards
requesting a deferential business judgment rule apply).
100. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF THE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 533 (5th ed. 2016)
(explaining that in a set of cases argued in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court
began a “single effort to bring meaningful judicial review to control
transactions”).
101. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
102. A search of both Westlaw and LexisNexis reveals that Smith v. Van
Gorkom was the first Delaware Supreme Court case to not only contain the
term “leveraged buyout” but to also review the sale process leading to the
buyout. From my research, it does not appear that the Delaware Supreme
Court had previously addressed MBOs either. The earliest Delaware
Chancery Court case to address MBOs appears to have been the 1983 case of
Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d 1089 (Del. Ch. 1983). The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed that case per curiam for the reasons stated in the lower court’s
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Followers of Delaware law are well-versed in the facts of Van
Gorkom—a leveraged buyout of Trans Union negotiated by Van
Gorkom, the CEO, with no oversight by Trans Union’s board. 103
In approaching Jay Pritzker, the buyer and a friend of Van
Gorkom, Van Gorkom did not simply ask Pritzker about his
interest in acquiring Trans Union in a LBO. 104 Rather, he
provided Pritzker with a per share sale pricing and a financing
structure, none of which he had run by the board or senior
management. 105 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court was not
only faced with an LBO but one with a quite imperfect sales
process. It was a case ripe for some preaching on what should
have been done or, in other words, it was the perfect case to
develop a set of deal norms.
A point that is often overlooked in discussing these cases,
particularly Van Gorkom, is the norms which had governed
director activity prior to 1985. Namely, there was a
“nonobligational practice norm that directors do not do
much.” 106 In the words of one practitioner, “[m]ost boards were
not much more than rubber stamps. The CEO said, ‘Jump’ and
directors were allowed just one question: How high? It wasn’t a
matter of not arguing with the boss—you typically didn’t even
question him.” 107 Thus, Van Gorkom marked not only a
fundamental shift in fiduciary duty law but a fundamental shift

opinion and did not issue a separate opinion. Field v. Allyn, 467 A.2d 1274
(Del. 1983). Accordingly, Smith v. Van Gorkom was the first Delaware
Supreme Court opinion issued in which the court took on leveraged buyouts
in any form. See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.
103. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864–70. Of interest for this Article, the CFO
briefly ran numbers to determine if an LBO was viable after seeing a “media
article” about a management-led buyout. Id. at 865. In addition, Van Gorkom
had rejected the idea of the sale of Trans Union being structured as an MBO
because of the conflict of interest which would arise as a result. Id. at 865.
104. Id. at 866.
105. Id.
106. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1271 (“Although this norm was not
obligational it had a significant effect on conduct, because it permitted a low
level of directorial care by insulating directors who did not do much from both
external criticism and self-criticism.”).
107. Roundtable: The Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 24 DIRS. & BDS. 28,
33 (2000) (quoting Boris Yavitz).
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in norms relating to directorial care. 108 As Professor Eisenberg
has written, the nonobligational “low level of directorial care”
changed to an “obligational norm that requires a higher level of
care.” 109
Instead of adopting a rule prohibiting LBOs, the court
scrutinized the process, or lack thereof. 110 In fact, the enduring
legacy of Van Gorkom is the process, which the court implied
the board should have followed in selling the company. 111 In
particular, the court focused on the board’s knowledge of Trans
Union’s value and on its failure to inform itself regarding Van
Gorkom’s “forcing” the deal and determining the price per
share. 112 In scrutinizing the process the court focused on the
number of board meetings held, the length of those meetings,
and the questions asked during the meetings. 113 The court
focused on the fact that the board did not have any documents
relating to the proposed merger nor did it have a summary of
the terms. 114 Furthermore, they had to rely on a twenty-minute
presentation by Van Gorkom regarding the content of the
merger agreement but he had never read the merger
agreement. 115 Moreover, the court stressed that Van Gorkom

108. Id. (indicating that in the Van Gorkom decision, Delaware raised the
threat of liability in order to force boards to put certain procedures in place).
109. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1265.
110. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874–93.
111. See Robert T. Miller, Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Kobayachi Maru:
The Place of the TransUnion Case in the Development of Delaware Corporate
Law, 9 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 65, 73 (2017) (“Van Gorkom was an attempt
by the Delaware Supreme Court to begin working out a regime to regulate
negotiated transactions.”).
112. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985).
113. See id. at 869 (stating that the meeting was two hours in length); id.
at 875 (noting the meeting was called without providing the board members
with a purpose for the meeting and that the board had never considered selling
Trans Union prior to this one board meeting); id. at 877 (stating that the board
had not asked any questions of the CFO regarding the “study” he had done,
who had suggested the $55 price, nor the tax implications or how the acquirer’s
share option was calculated).
114. See id. at 875 (noting “the total absence of any documentation
whatsoever”).
115. Id. at 874.
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had not told the board that the purpose of the meeting was to
authorize a merger. 116
In addition, the court implied that the board should have
asked for an outside valuation study. 117 The court, however,
specifically stated that such a study was not “essential to
support an informed business judgment” and further
emphasized that “fairness opinions by independent investment
bankers are [not] required as a matter of law.” 118 The court
clarified that directors who were “familiar with the business of
a going concern are in a better position than are outsiders to
gather relevant information.” 119 Despite this clarification,
dealmakers have acted as though fairness opinions are required
in almost every company sale. 120
It was not just the court’s statements about fairness
opinions to which dealmakers reacted. Dealmakers were quick
to take note of the entire opinion and to begin to advise their
clients accordingly. 121 Bayless Manning may best represent the
116. Id. at 867.
117. Id. at 876.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. L. REV. 1557, 1560
(2006) (noting that practitioners have treated fairness opinions as “virtually
mandatory”).
121. I would be remiss if I did not address the controversial nature of Van
Gorkom. This decision represented the first time that a board of directors of a
public company was held monetarily liable solely for breaching the duty of care
by not being properly informed. See Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate
Director’s Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505,
522 (1985) (stating that Van Gorkom was the first case to impose liability on
directors for a failing to perform a “reasonable inquiry”); Charles J. Hartmann
& Pamela Gayle Rogers, The Influence of Smith v. Van Gorkom on Director’s
and Officer’s Liability, 58 J. RISK & INS. 525, 528 (1991) (stating that Van
Gorkom “appears to be the first case” imposing liability “solely on the basis of
the board’s decision making processes” (citation omitted)). But see Cox, supra
note 8, at 524 (stating that prior to Van Gorkom there were a “handful of cases”
where the court found directors breached their duty of care but none of them
“involved public companies”). Practitioners and academics alike criticized the
decision, even calling it “surely one of the worst decisions in the history of
corporate law.” Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985); see Bernard S. Sharfman, The
Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 287, 289 (2008)
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reaction by lawyers when he stated, in an article published
shortly after Van Gorkom, that “[t]he opinion is a recital of
explicit and implicit do’s and don’ts.” 122 In his article, Manning
dissected the opinion, dividing the “do’s” and “don’ts” into two
columns taking up almost six and a half law review pages. 123 He
explained that if dealmakers engaged in more activity under
Column II (the “do” column) and less activity under Column I
(the “don’t” column), dealmakers would earn a better “grade.” 124
However, the more they engaged in an activity listed in the
“don’t” column, the more likely a court would be to find that
management has acted in a grossly negligent fashion. 125
As Manning’s equation implies, the “do’s” and “don’ts” set
forth in Van Gorkom are both a standard of conduct and a set of
norms. More specifically, the court assembled a set of
obligational norms—norms with which dealmakers felt obliged
to comply. As practitioners moved forward in the wake of Van
Gorkom, they had a checklist of best practices. They knew that
the more they complied with this checklist, the more likely the
transaction would be to pass Delaware’s scrutiny. 126 Other
practitioners were quick to acknowledge this checklist. For
example, other practitioners advised that following the focus on
process in Van Gorkom, “[d]irectors will not be able to satisfy
this requirement by initiating a series of cosmetic decisional
processes . . . merely parading a set of investment bankers,
attorneys, and accountants through boardrooms will not be
sufficient to protect corporate directors from potential

(noting that “from the beginning” the decision was “heavily criticized”). For a
comprehensive listing of articles by both practitioners and scholars, see Miller,
supra note 111, at 70 n.3.
122. Bayliss Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the
Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (1985).
123. See id. at 8–14 (comparing actions that Van Gorkom disapproved to
actions that should be taken by officers and directors).
124. Id. at 3.
125. See id. (noting that only performing a minority of the “do’s” would be
“grossly negligent”).
126. See, e.g., Roundtable: The Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note
107, at 32 (“The lesson for boards after this case is all about the process: Follow
the right process and the board’s actions in takeover settings will be relatively
free from attack.” (internal quotations omitted)).

DELAWARE AS DEAL ARBITER

1293

liability.” 127 Instead, they advised that boards must delve
deeper and take the time necessary to understand reports, to
read relevant documentation, to understand the background of
the transaction, and to think about the decision they are
making. 128 In other words, there was a set process on this
checklist. Delaware would be able to look at a new transaction
holding the Van Gorkom checklist in their hands and compare
the two transactions. The less the transaction had the bad
qualities of Van Gorkom and the more the transaction reflected
the norms set forth by the Supreme Court, the more likely the
directors’ conduct would be to get the benefit of the business
judgment rule.
2.

Unocal Enhanced Scrutiny Standard

Van Gorkom was just the beginning of a big year for the
Delaware Supreme Court in reviewing M&A transactions.
About six months after its decision in Van Gorkom, the
Delaware Supreme Court issued its now famous decision in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 129 The court addressed
Unocal’s adoption of a self-tender offer which excluded Mesa
Petroleum who had launched a two-tier front-end loaded tender
offer for Unocal’s stock. 130 The court stated that when the board
is faced with a hostile takeover, it has an obligation to
“determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.” 131 Because there is a
possibility that the board could be “acting primarily in its own
interests,” the board’s decisions to take defensive measures to
ward off a hostile takeover are subject to an enhanced standard
127. Herbert S. Wander & Alain G. LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters:
Corporate Control Transactions and Today’s Business Judgment Rule, 42 BUS.
LAW. 29, 40 (1986).
128. See id. at 40–41 (“Directors must also make an extended effort to
become informed about the background of the decision to be made and to read
and understand the relevant documents involved.”).
129. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
130. Id. at 953 ([The issues are:] [d]id the Unocal board have the power
and duty to oppose a takeover threat it reasonably perceived to be harmful to
the corporate enterprise, and if so, is its action here entitled to the protection
of the business judgment rule?”).
131. Id. at 954.
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of review. 132 More specifically, this enhanced scrutiny requires
the directors to “show that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed.” 133 Once the danger is established, the defense “must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” 134
In a later case, Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 135
the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that the proportionality
prong of Unocal breaks down into a two-step analysis. 136 First,
the court makes an inquiry into whether the defensive device is
draconian, more specifically whether it is either coercive or
preclusive. 137 If the device is not draconian, then the court
determines whether the defensive mechanism falls “within a
range of reasonableness.” 138 This Article is not going to address
the norms arising in the context of hostile transactions.
However, the Unocal/Unitrin enhanced scrutiny standard is
significant as Delaware later extended this standard to deal
with protection devices in negotiated transactions, which will be
discussed in Part V.A. below.
3.

Revlon & the Maximization of Stockholder Value

Less than one year after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme
Court issued another legendary decision, Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 139 Like with Van Gorkom
and Unocal, scholars of corporate law are well-versed in the
facts of Revlon—Pantry Pride’s hostile takeover attempt of
Revlon in which the Revlon board sought out a white knight. 140
132. Id.
133. Id. at 955.
134. Id.
135. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
136. See id. at 1387–88 (noting that cases applying Unocal reveal a “direct
correlation between findings of proportionality or disproportionality and the
judicial determination of whether a defensive response was draconian because
it was either coercive or preclusive in character”).
137. See id. (“[T]his Court has consistently recognized that defensive
measures which are either preclusive or coercive are included within the
common law definition of draconian.”).
138. Id. at 1388 (citations omitted).
139. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
140. Id. at 177.
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The white knight, Forstmann Little & Co., and Pantry Pride
ultimately ended up in a bidding war, in which the Revlon board
of course favored Forstmann. 141 In reviewing the board’s
actions, the court stated that once the bidding war had begun,
it was clear that Revlon was going to be broken up. 142 At that
point, “[t]he directors’ role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.” 143 This
obligation to maximize stockholder value became known as a
board’s Revlon duties. 144 Similar to the decision in Van Gorkom,
Revlon duties focus on the process the board follows in selling a
company. 145 In other words, it created further obligational
norms for companies engaging in a break-up of the company.
However, since Revlon had not involved a friendly, negotiated
transaction from the start, practitioners were not sure whether
Revlon applied in those situations. 146 What was clear was that
Revlon applied in the context of hostile transactions, if the board
adopted a defensive strategy resulting in a sale of control. 147
141. See id. at 178 (“[T]he directors unanimously agreed to a leveraged
buyout by Forstmann.”).
142. See id. at 182 (explaining that when Pantry Pride continued
increasing its offers, “it became apparent to all that the break-up of the
company was inevitable”).
143. Id.
144. See Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 519, 521 (2009) (stating that the board’s fiduciary duties “are aimed at
serving the short-term interests of the stockholders in achieving a transaction
that will maximize the immediate value of their shares” and that these duties
are called “Revlon duties”).
145. See id. (“Under current Delaware law, if a business combination is
deemed to constitute a ‘sale of the company’ or a ‘sale of control’ it is governed
by the Revlon doctrine.” (citations omitted)).
146. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 46 (1990)
Can a company agree to be acquired in what used to be the
traditional manner—that is, an agreement negotiated at arm’s
length calling for a form of transaction, like a merger or sale of
assets, that normally requires shareholder approval—without
shopping the transaction or otherwise conducting an auction?
147. Revlon did not use the terms “sale of control” or “change of control.”
However, those terms quickly came into use following cases such as Mills

1296

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269 (2020)

The Supreme Court did not just announce an enhanced
obligation to maximize stockholder value. It also provided
extensive guidance on the deal protection devices, which the
Revlon board had adopted in its negotiations and agreement
with Forstmann. 148 The Supreme Court applied the Unocal
standard to these deal protection devices. 149 More specifically,
Revlon had granted Forstmann a lock-up option to purchase two
of Revlon’s key divisions for a discount if another buyer acquired
forty percent of Revlon’s shares. 150 The court made clear that
lock-ups were not per se illegal and that they could be used to
help maximize stockholder value by drawing bidders into an
auction. 151 However, in Revlon, the lock-up was not used in that
manner but rather it was used to shut down an active bidding
process. 152 The court found similarly with respect to a no shop
provision and termination fee. 153 It noted that no shops, like
lock-up options, are not per se illegal but that the no shop, like
the lock-up, ended the bidding rather than increased it. 154 This,
the court stated, was “impermissible under the Unocal
standards.” 155
So, Revlon expanded upon the Van Gorkom checklist.
Revlon not only created obligational norms for companies
engaging in an auction, but it also created obligational norms
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), and Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
148. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–84 (reviewing a crown jewel lock-up
option, no shop provision, and termination fee).
149. See id. at 183–84 (stating that the merger agreement “was
unreasonable in relation to the threat posed” and that the no shop provision
was not permissible under Unocal).
150. Id. at 178.
151. See id. at 183 (noting that the use of a lock-up option had been
approved in an earlier Delaware Court of Chancery case).
152. See id. (explaining that “measures which end an active auction and
foreclose further bidding operate to the shareholders’ detriment”).
153. See id. at 184 (“The no-shop provision, like the lock-up option, while
not per se illegal, is impermissible under the Unocal standards when a board’s
primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the
company to the highest bidder.”).
154. Id. at 184.
155. Id.
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for the use of deal protection devices. 156 However, Revlon left
open some significant questions for dealmakers and academics
alike; namely, when was Revlon triggered and how exactly does
a board go about satisfying its Revlon duties. 157 It quickly
became clear that Revlon applied in friendly, negotiated
transactions involving a sale or change of control. 158 The
evolution of the deal norms regarding how exactly a board may
satisfy its Revlon duties in a sale or change of control
transaction will be addressed in the next Part.
V.

The Evolution of the Trifecta Deal Norms and Its Impact
on Delaware Deal Law

A.

The Extension of Unocal to Deal Protection Devices and a
Slide into Reasonableness

Although Delaware developed the Unocal/Unitrin
enhanced scrutiny standard in the context of hostile takeovers,
in 2003 in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 159 the
Delaware Supreme Court made clear that this standard
extended to deal protection devices in negotiated
transactions. 160 Moreover, Omnicare represented the first case
in which Delaware found that a board may not completely
lock-up a transaction in a non-change of control situation. 161 The
156. See Furlow, supra note 144, at 521 (describing the nature of the duties
arising under Revlon).
157. See J. ANTHONY TERRELL, REVLON IN REVIEW 1 (2016), https://perma.cc
/VMR6-YWSU (PDF) (describing questions in the aftermath of Revlon).
158. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989) (applying Revlon to a negotiated sale of control); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284–85 (Del. 1989) (applying Revlon to a
negotiated transaction); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 42–44 (Del. 1994) (stating that Revlon applies in negotiated, sale of
control transactions).
159. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
160. See id. at 932 (analogizing a board’s decision to enter into deal
protection devices to taking defensive measures in the context of a hostile
takeover).
161. Barry G. Sher & Israel David, Deal Protection Provisions in Mergers:
A Discussion of Omnicare v. NCS, in DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS 60 app. at 63 (2003), https://perma.cc/ZDU5-QZW5
(PDF).
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facts of Omnicare were quite unique. They involved the
stock-for-stock sale of a financially distressed company, NCS,
following a bidding process. 162 Due to its financial situation,
NCS was left with only one viable bidder who demanded a no
shop provision, a force-the-vote provision, termination fee, and,
most importantly, a voting agreement locking up sixty-five
percent of the vote. 163 The Delaware Supreme Court determined
that these deal protection devices together acted as a “fait
accompli,” leaving the minority shareholders with no viable
option to reject the proposed transaction. 164 As such, the court
held that the transaction must include an effective fiduciary
out. 165
Commentators feared that Omnicare would have a negative
impact on the market for mergers. 166 They predicted that
dealmakers would use fewer and less restrictive deal protection
devices. 167 Commentators also quickly suggested that the
controversial holding in Omnicare would be limited to its
facts. 168 This last prediction came true, at least in part, the
following year, in Orman v. Cullman, 169 when the Delaware
Court of Chancery had its first opportunity to apply
162. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920–22, 925 (describing NCS’s financial
situation, its search for strategic alternatives, initial proposals received from
Omnicare and Genesis, and stock-for-stock ratio).
163. See id. at 924–26 (describing terms of deal with Genesis).
164. Id. at 936.
165. See id. (describing need of an effective fiduciary out).
166. See Megan W. Shaner, Revisiting Omnicare: What Does its Status 10
Years Later Tell Us?, 38 J. CORP. L. 865, 878 (2013) (explaining commentators
believed that Omnicare would result in Delaware being an “option contract
state” which would result in less bidding parties or lower prices being paid for
targets); Steven M. Davidoff, The Long, Slow Death of Omnicare, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Aug. 28, 2008, 4:22 PM), https://perma.cc/F4KL-6CAN (stating
that commentators thought bidders may bid less frequently due to a lack of
certainty in transactions).
167. See Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J.
CORP. L. 681, 702 (2013) (stating that practitioners were fearful that Delaware
courts would “regularly scrutinize and strike down lock-ups, countering the
trend in termination fee growth”).
168. See Sher & David, supra note 161, at 63 (describing various
viewpoints in the wake of Omnicare, including that it may be limited to its
facts and, thus, not have an impact on most transactions).
169. No. Civ.A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
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Omnicare. 170 Orman involved similar facts as Omnicare but
there were some distinct differences. Namely, unlike in
Omnicare, deal protection devices did not act as a fait accompli
as the deal included a majority of the minority provision. 171
Thus, there was an effective fiduciary out in Orman. So, has
Omnicare been limited to its facts? Many practitioners would
say yes. 172 But, in reality, the parties in Orman took note of the
obligational norm to have an effective fiduciary out and
incorporated that into their transaction. 173 As such, the
Delaware Court of Chancery was easily able to distinguish
Omnicare because dealmakers complied with the obligational
norm.
In reviewing practitioner reactions to Orman, it is evident
that a few other norms arose out of the case. First, Orman
involved a voting agreement with an eighteen-month duration,
which the plaintiffs had argued was unreasonable due to its
length. 174 The Chancery Court rejected this argument. 175
Practitioners interpreted this as “provid[ing] some comfort that
a lock-up period of eighteen months will not be deemed
unreasonable per se.” 176 In addition, practitioners took a broader
norm from Orman. That is, they interpreted the court’s decision
as “confirm[ing] that there is no preference in the law for any

170. See id. at *5 (distinguishing the voting agreement in Orman from the
voting agreement in Omnicare); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di
Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from
1993–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PENN. L. REV.
1399, 1461 (2005) (“Orman indicates a possible trend toward limiting the
majority holding in Omnicare to its facts.”).
171. Orman, 2004 WL 2348395, at *7.
172. See, e.g., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CLIENT ALERT NO. 418, REFUSING
TO EXTEND OMNICARE, DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT UPHOLDS 18-MONTH
LOCK-UP 6 (2004), https://perma.cc/6Y54-XXHN (PDF) [hereinafter CLIENT
ALERT NO. 418] (stating that the holding in Orman was “consistent with some
commentators’ predictions that the Chancery Court would limit Omnicare to
its facts”).
173. See Orman, 2004 WL 2348395, at *1 (noting that “the board had
negotiated an effective fiduciary out”).
174. Id. at *8.
175. Id.
176. CLIENT ALERT NO. 418, supra note 172, at 6.
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particular form of deal protection over any other.” 177 They went
on to explain that “assuming the overarching Omnicare/Unocal
standards are satisfied, practitioners should have broad
latitude in choosing what form of deal protection to use.” 178
In the years since Omnicare, practitioners have been
careful not to completely lock-up deals in negotiated
transactions. 179 But anyone who thought that practitioners
would respond with less restrictive deal protection devices were
sorely mistaken. Instead, dealmakers answered by using
combinations of devices to lock-up merger agreements as much
as possible without violating Omnicare. 180 In other words, so
long as the suite of devices contained an effective fiduciary out
dealmakers considered those devices to be consistent with the
norms set forth by Delaware. But this is where the “give and
take” between dealmakers and Delaware began to take effect
and ultimately impacted the level of scrutiny applied to deal
protection devices. More specifically, when these combinations
of deal protection devices were challenged, Delaware generally
responded by upholding the devices as being consistent with
what is typical in the market and what Delaware had upheld in
previous cases. 181 What Delaware was really saying is that these
devices were in line with the norms which had been developed
via case law and the interpretation of those norms by
dealmakers.
By way of some examples, in 2015, in In re Zale Corp.
Stockholders Litigation, 182 the Court of Chancery rejected an
argument that the no shop, matching rights, and 2.75 percent
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Shaner, supra note 166, at 885 (describing practitioners’ reaction
to Omnicare and how practitioners have drafted deal protection devices in a
manner that they would not violate Omnicare).
180. Id.
181. See infra note 195 for examples of these cases. See also Megan W.
Shaner, How “Bad Law, Bad Economics and Bad Policy” Positively Shaped
Corporate Behavior, 47 AKRON L. REV. 753, 788 (2014) (describing how
pre-Omnicare there was a focus on individual deal protection devices but
Omnicare caused dealmakers and courts to consider the total package of deal
protection devices).
182. Consolidated No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 5853693 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1,
2015).
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termination fee were unreasonable. 183 The court specifically
stated “[a] number of Delaware cases, however, have rejected
similar, and even more stringent, collections of deal protection
measures as a basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim.” 184 It
went on to look favorably upon the board’s inclusion of a
fiduciary out provision, among other factors. 185 One of the cases
on which the Zale court relied was Dent v. Ramtron
International Corp., 186 in which the Chancery Court reviewed a
challenge to a no shop provision, standstill provision, change in
recommendation provision, information rights, and a
termination fee. 187 In upholding these devices, the court noted
that the no shop provision was similar to ones the court had
upheld in the past. 188 The court also noted the inclusion of a
meaningful fiduciary out provision, and, like Zale, stated that
“[s]imilar, if not more potent, combinations of deal protection
devices often have been upheld by this Court.” 189 In upholding
the matching rights in Ramtron, the court quoted both In re
Toys “R” Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation 190 and In re
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation. 191 In
upholding the devices in both cases, the Chancery Court relied
upon the customary nature of the deal protection devices at
issue. 192 More specifically, in Smurfit-Stone, the court noted
that the no shop and matching right provisions in the agreement

183. Id. at *16.
184. Id.
185. See id. (“[T]he Board’s successful inclusion of both a fiduciary out
provision and a reverse termination fee twice as large as the termination
fee . . . are indicative of good faith negotiating on behalf of Zale’s stockholders
rather than bad faith.”).
186. No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL 2931180 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014).
187. Id. at *8.
188 Id. (“The no-solicitation provision at issue does not appear to deviate
in any meaningful way from similar types of provisions that repeatedly have
been approved by this Court.”).
189. Id. at *9.
190. 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005).
191. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011); see
Ramtron, 2014 WL 2931180, at *9 n.32.
192. See infra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
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were “customary in public company mergers today.” 193
Similarly, in Toys “R” Us, the court stated that the termination
fee and matching rights were “common contractual
feature[s].” 194 The listing of Delaware cases with comments
similar to these could go on as the majority of cases in which
there has been a challenge to deal protection devices invokes
similar reasoning to these cases. 195
Since Delaware heavily focuses on what is customary in
terms of deal protection devices, practitioners also focus on what
is customary, or, in other words, what the norms for these
devices are. For example, Westlaw’s Practical Law database
193. Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *21 n.141. In upholding the
termination fee, the court in that case also stated that it had upheld “several
termination fees of similar size.” Id. at *21.
194. In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017.
195. See, e.g., In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013
WL 5631233, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“In fact, the allegedly
unreasonable deal-protection devices—a no-solicitation provision, a poison
pill, a reasonable termination fee, information rights, and a top-up
option— have been routinely upheld by this Court.”); In re Novell, Inc. S’holder
Litig., No. 6033-VCN, 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013)
The deal protection devices in the Merger Agreement—the no
solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the
termination fee—are customary and well within the range
permitted under Delaware law. The mere inclusion of such routine
terms does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. . . . Delaware
courts have recognized that these provisions are common in merger
agreements, and may sometimes be necessary to secure a strong
bid.
In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928,
at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (upholding a no shop, five business days
matching rights, and 3.3 percent termination fee, stating “Delaware courts
have repeatedly recognized ‘that provisions such as these are standard merger
terms, are not per se unreasonable, and do not alone constitute breaches of
fiduciary duty,’” and there’s no evidence these provisions bar bidders); In re
3Com S’holders Litig., No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec.
18, 2009) (upholding a more than four percent termination fee, five business
days matching rights, and no shop, stating “this Court has repeatedly held
that provisions such as these are standard merger terms, are not per
se unreasonable, and do not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty” and
there’s no evidence these bar bidders); see also Christina M. Sautter, The
Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making, 41 J. CORP. L. 817, 845–55 (2016)
(containing a chart setting forth Delaware cases available on Westlaw from
2003 to 2014 in which there were challenges to deal protection devices,
including the deal protection devices, and the outcome of each case).
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includes a “What’s Market” database which summarizes deal
provisions in recent deals. 196 In addition, each year the ABA
publishes a Deal Points Study summarizing provisions in public
company deals. 197 Moreover, over the years, numerous law firm
memoranda and client materials have summarized recent deal
protection devices and provided advice regarding the drafting of
these devices. 198 These types of publications and summaries
help to reinforce and perpetuate deal norms and provide more
of a basis for Delaware to uphold deal protection devices as
being consistent with deal norms.
But upholding deal protection devices on the basis that they
are consistent with deal norms has a potentially detrimental
effect. More precisely, it has resulted in a weakening of the

196. See What’s Market, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
197. See, e.g., M&A MARKET TRENDS SUBCOMMITTEE, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S BUSINESS LAW
SECTION, STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A DEAL POINTS STUDY (FOR
TRANSACTIONS ANNOUNCED IN 2016), 43–77 (summarizing common wording of
deal protection devices for transactions in 2016); M&A MARKET TRENDS
SUBCOMMITTEE, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION’S BUSINESS LAW SECTION, STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A
DEAL POINTS STUDY (FOR TRANSACTIONS ANNOUNCED IN 2015), 37–72
(summarizing common wording of deal protection devices for transactions in
2015); M&A MARKET TRENDS SUBCOMMITTEE, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S BUSINESS LAW SECTION,
STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A DEAL POINTS STUDY (FOR
TRANSACTIONS ANNOUNCED IN 2014), 22ND NATIONAL M&A INSTITUTE, Slides
44–74 (2017) (summarizing common wording of deal protection devices for
transactions in 2014).
198. See, e.g., David Fox & Daniel Wolf, Deal Protection: One Size Does Not
Fit All, PRAC. L. (2010) https://perma.cc/H8PG-DDR2 (PDF) (discussing recent
trends in deal protection and providing factors to consider in negotiating deal
protection); Noah Kornblith, Break-Up Fees in Delaware: A Delicate Balance
for All Parties, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Apr. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc
/3QFD-AMA4 (discussing termination fees); LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, DEAL
PROTECTION MECHANISMS (Feb. 2016), https://perma.cc/DE7P-65HW (PDF)
(providing descriptions of common deal protection devices); Abigail Pickering
Bomba et al., Termination Fees: Possible Expanded Judicial
Flexibility— Comverge, Practice Tips and Ideas for Structuring, 19 THE M&A
LAWYER 15 (Feb. 2015) (discussing termination fees generally, providing a
summary of Chancery Court decisions, and providing tips for structuring
termination fees).
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enhanced scrutiny standard. 199 The Delaware courts have been
extremely deferential in their application of the Unocal/Unitrin
enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protection devices. 200 Even
though the courts, particularly the Court of Chancery, may use
Unocal/Unitrin terminology such as “preclusive” or “coercive,”
the court generally does not engage in an Unocal/Unitrin
analysis. 201 Instead, as alluded to above, it will uphold deal
protection devices as reasonable largely because they are
consistent with, or less restrictive than, a set of devices used in
prior transactions. 202
In Lock-Up Creep, Professor Davidoff Solomon and I argued
that this deferential approach, in turn, has led to more extensive
and more intricate deal protection devices becoming standard
market practice. 203 We dubbed this phenomenon “lock-up
creep.” 204 In other words, the “give and take” between
dealmakers and Delaware have resulted in a bit of a chicken
and the egg situation. Dealmakers have followed Delaware
norms and pushed the envelope ever so slightly while Delaware
reacts in an extremely deferential fashion concluding that these
practices are consistent with deal norms. Then, in turn, we have
a slide into a reasonableness standard and lock-up creep. 205
199. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 167, at 683 (“The Delaware Court
of Chancery in a series of cases after Omnicare and perhaps in response,
adopted deferential standards of scrutiny for lock-ups.”).
200. See id. at 703, 708 (“[The court] adopted what could be equated with
a deferential standard for review of lock-ups.”).
201. See id. at 702–03, 706 (explaining that the Delaware Chancery Court
will use “preclusive” or “coercive” terminology, but a review of the cases reveals
the court is not using enhanced scrutiny).
202. See supra notes 179–195 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this reasoning and supra note 195 and accompanying text for examples of
additional cases utilizing similar reasoning.
203. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 167, at 683 (arguing that following
Omnicare the Delaware Court of Chancery “adopted deferential standards of
scrutiny for lock-ups. . . . [T]hese decisions opened up space for lock-up creep
to occur”).
204. Id. at 681.
205. In Lock-Up Creep, we argued,
Our review of [deal protection] cases thus leads us to conclude that
repeatedly stating lock-ups are not per se unreasonable and
continually upholding lock-ups so long as they are market terms,

DELAWARE AS DEAL ARBITER
B.

1305

The Evolution of Revlon—A Slide into Reasonableness

Similar to Delaware’s slide into reasonableness in the deal
protection context, a comparable slide has occurred in the
instance of Revlon duties. 206 In the years following Revlon,
Delaware refined what actions were required of boards when
Revlon is applicable. In these cases, Delaware shifted away from
the auctioneering language, which Revlon seemingly required,

the Chancery Court has abandoned enhanced scrutiny analysis in
favor of a reasonableness analysis. Of course, one can argue this is
circular. If reasonableness is a market standard, then the market
can change. And change it did as we have seen. In the period during
and after these decisions, we have seen the expansion of market
creep.
Id. at 708. But see Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of
Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (2007) (arguing that termination
fee creep subsided by the 2000s).
206. Many commentators have argued that enhanced scrutiny standards
have become nothing more than reasonableness standards. See, e.g., Iman
Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A
Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 198–205 (2019) (arguing that the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin ultimately erodes enhanced
scrutiny standards); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of
Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 210 (2014) (stating that “continuing
assertions about the Revlon duty imposing a higher ‘reasonableness’ standard
of scrutiny than ordinary business judgment rule review, and requiring that
directors carry an initial burden of proof, are, in the personal liability context,
outworn and faulty doctrinal vestiges” (citation omitted)); Paul L. Regan,
What’s Left of Unocal, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 951–70 (2001) (arguing that the
added fiduciary protections Unocal and Moran v. Household International,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), promoted have essentially been eliminated by
case law through the years); Andrew D. Kinsey, Comment, Hand-Waiving as
a New Standard of Review: When Analyzing Matching Rights, Has the
Delaware Court of Chancery Abdicated Its Review Process, 121 PA. ST. L. REV.
907, 921 (2016) (arguing that although Delaware courts are supposed to use
an intermediate standard of review on challenges to deal protection measures,
the Delaware Court of Chancery dismisses matching rights without engaging
in an analysis, which “stand[s] in stark contrast to how the courts have
analyzed other deal protection measures”); Mary Siegel, The Illusion of
Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 624 (2013)
(arguing that the Unocal standard has developed to allow “boards—especially
independent ones—to enact all but the most egregious defensive tactics under
the veneer of judicial review”).
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to a reasonableness requirement. 207 Basically, boards satisfy the
reasonableness requirement if they engage in the process (i.e.,
the norms) outlined initially in Van Gorkom and Revlon and
further refined in their progeny in cases like Barkan v. Amsted
Industries, Inc. 208 and Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan. 209
Four years after Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court
issued its decision in Barkan in which it reviewed a challenge to
an MBO and clarified its expectations for boards in exercising
their Revlon duties. 210 It famously stated that “there is no single
blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties” and that
“Revlon does not demand that every change in the control of a
Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding
contest.” 211 The court went on to recognize that the corporate
environment was dynamic and that dealmakers could be flexible
in selling companies. 212 This flexibility not only allows a
company to engage in an active bidding process, in which case
the company would be prohibited from favoring a certain bidder,
but also to consider an offer from a single bidder. 213 In the latter
situation, the court indicated that if the board did not have
“reliable grounds upon which to judge [the] adequacy” of a single
207. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court in Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc. seemed to favor an auction but left the door open to use other
methods of sale. 559 A.2d 1261, 1286–87 (Del. 1989). More specifically, the
court stated,
Directors are not required by Delaware law to conduct an auction
according to some standard formula, only that they observe the
significant requirement of fairness for the purpose of enhancing
general shareholder interests. . . . We recognize that the conduct of
a corporate auction is a complex undertaking both in its design and
execution. We do not intend to limit the broad negotiating authority
of the directors to achieve the best price available to the
stockholders. To properly secure that end may require the board to
invoke a panoply of devices, and the giving or receiving of
concessions that may benefit one bidder over another.
Id. (citations omitted).
208. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
209. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
210. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1279.
211. Id. at 1286.
212. See id. (acknowledging there were “evolving techniques and financing
devices”).
213. Id. at 1286–87.

DELAWARE AS DEAL ARBITER

1307

offer, a canvas of the market would be required. 214 However, if
the board did have a “body of reliable evidence,” a canvas of the
market is not needed. 215 But the court warned that the
“circumstances in which this passive approach is acceptable are
limited” and that “‘[a] decent respect for reality forces one to
admit that . . . advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a
pale substitute for the dependable information that a canvas of
the relevant market can provide.’” 216
Despite this warning, however, the court then concluded
that the board in Barkan had reliable evidence in the form of
the special committee’s advice from investment bankers, the
fact that the market was aware that Amsted was “in play” and
no other bidders had come forward, and that the tax advantages
from the MBO offer allowed that offer to be higher than what
other parties might possibly pay. 217 Allowing for such “reliable
evidence” in lieu of a more active bidding process further refined
the norms relating to process when a company is in
Revlon-mode. These norms allowed for latitude deferring to the
board members who are in the trenches each day and recognized
that not every sale lends itself to an active bidding process. 218
In the three-plus decades since Barkan, numerous other
cases expanded upon Barkan’s “no single blueprint” format,
endorsing a reliance on the board’s knowledge in lieu of a more
active sales process. 219 Like Barkan, a number of other
Delaware cases have permitted negotiations with only a single
bidder, including allowing a reliance on window shops and go
shop provisions to provide reliable evidence regarding deal
214. Id. at 1287.
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting Letter Op. at 19–20, In re Amsted Indus. Litig., No. 8224,
1988 WL 92736 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988)),
217. Id. at 1287–88.
218. See Afra Afsharipour & J. Travis Laster, Enhanced Scrutiny on the
Buy-Side, 53 GA. L. REV. 443, 465 (2019) (explaining that the Delaware
Supreme Court has “reiterated that Revlon did not impose conduct obligations
on directors”).
219. In a prior article, I argued that despite the language of many
Delaware opinions which appears to favor more extensive sales processes, the
courts continue to treat deals following less extensive sales processes the same
as deals involving more robust sales processes. Sautter, supra note 195, at 834.
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value. 220 Like with deal protection devices, dealmakers have
taken note of the norms set forth in the Revlon line of cases. For
example, a 2007 Fenwick & West memorandum suggests that
smaller microcap companies should engage in a pre-signing
market check while larger public companies do not need to do
so, particularly if they agree to a go shop provision. 221 It further
suggests soliciting strategic bidders (in addition to private
equity bidders), unless there is a “reasonable, factual basis for
[not] doing so based on current information.” 222 In addition,
Fenwick & West reiterates the lesson first learned in Revlon
itself—that is, to treat all bidders fairly. 223
In 2009, in Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court further
confirmed that “directors must ‘engage actively in the sale
process,’ and they must confirm that they have obtained the best
available price either by conducting an auction, by conducting a
market check, or by demonstrating ‘an impeccable knowledge of
the market.’” 224 The court clarified the level of knowledge
required when the issue is whether a board has acted in good
faith to satisfy its Revlon duties. 225 Like the process emphasized
in previous cases such as Van Gorkom and Barkan, the court
220. See In re Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. S’holder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013
WL 1909124, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) (addressing challenge to a single
bidder transaction and stating “a post-agreement market check can be an
effective way to ensure that a company obtains the best price reasonably
available”); Sautter, supra note 36, at 542–57 (describing the reliance on
post-signing market checks and go shop provisions and summarizing relevant
case law).
221. David W. Healey, Corporate and Securities Update: M&A
Development-Deal Process and Protections (Netsmart, Lear and Topps):
Lessons on What Not to Do When Selling Your Company, Fenwick & West LLP,
1 (2007), https://perma.cc/FY7M-FKMD (PDF).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (citations
omitted).
225. The Lyondell charter contained an exculpation provision which
protected the directors from personal liability arising from a breach of the duty
of care. Id. at 239. Accordingly, the issue before the court was whether the
board had acted consistent with its duty of loyalty. Id. The Delaware Supreme
Court noted that if the issue had been whether the board had acted with due
care, it would not have had an issue with the Chancery Court asking for
“additional evidence.” Id. at 243.
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considered similar factors as well as the fact that there was no
evidence the board was conflicted. 226 More specifically, it
focused on the number of times the board met, their awareness
of the company’s value and the industry generally, their seeking
out and following advice from financial and legal advisors, their
attempt to “negotiate a higher offer” despite indications that the
existing offer was a “‘blowout’ price,” and their approval of the
agreement “because ‘it was simply too good not to pass along [to
the stockholders] for their consideration.’” 227
Five years after Lyondell, in C&J Energy Services, Inc. v.
City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’
Retirement Trust, 228 the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed a
case in which the Court of Chancery had “imposed a pre-signing
solicitation requirement” despite the inclusion of a no shop
paired with a fiduciary out. 229 The court stated, “as the years go
by, people seem to forget that Revlon was largely about a board’s
resistance to a particular bidder and its subsequent attempts to
prevent market forces from surfacing the highest bid.” 230 The
court went on to state that the target in C&J Energy Services
had not erected such barriers to entry and there was sufficient
time for another bidder to come forward. 231 Of course
dealmakers took note. A Skadden Arps memo stated that “C&J
Energy confirms that the Delaware courts will not lightly
interfere with a disinterested board’s decisions about how to
pursue a change of control transaction.” 232 More recently, the
Senior Chairman of Sullivan & Cromwell stated that “[t]he
general perception is that you do not [need to shop a company],
provided that there are no obstacles of significance against

226. Id. at 243–44.
227. Id. at 244 (alteration in original).
228. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014).
229. Id. at 1069.
230. Id. at 1070.
231. Id.
232. Robert S. Saunders, & Arthur R. Bookout, Delaware Supreme Court
Reaffirms Important Protections for Corporate Directors, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/ARS4-GSLK.
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somebody coming in over the top.” 233 Despite that auctioneering
language in Revlon and statements in other Delaware cases that
more robust sales processes are favorable, a norm has clearly
developed in Delaware that negotiations with a single bidder
are sufficient so long as there are no major impediments to
another bidder emerging. 234
Many scholars, including myself, have spent countless
hours researching and writing about the evolution of Revlon
duties and many have come to the conclusion that Revlon has
been eroded. To date, no one has specifically focused on deal
norms as a path to the erosion although Professor Mohsen
Monash has come close. 235 In response to an argument that
Revlon has been diminished throughout the years, Professor
Monash argued,
[i]n fact, rather than reveal the erosion of the doctrine, the
lack of judicial enforcement may show the opposite:
that Revlon, as a normative concern, is enduring and
pervasive. To be specific, it may be the case that boards have
fundamentally internalized Revlon’s core dictate—that
directors’ sole fiduciary obligation is “to get[] the best price
for the stockholders.”’ In an era of shareholder
empowerment and intense investor activism, for better or
worse, directors nowadays worship at the altar of
shareholder value maximization. 236

Professor Monash is correct when he states that boards
have internalized the duty to maximize stockholder value.
Although he also is correct that companies generally value
shareholder maximization over everything else, something else
also has occurred. That is, dealmakers have internalized the
process repeatedly set forth in the Revlon line of cases. 237 These
processes have become obligational norms. So much so that even
in non-change of control transactions, dealmakers oftentimes
233. William D. Cohan, “Many, Many States Have Explicitly Rejected
Revlon”: With Revlon for Sale, the Hostile Takeover Era Ron Perelman Started
Comes to an End, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/286M-ZZA6.
234. See Sautter, supra note 195, at 856–62 (describing sales processes in
twenty-eight Delaware cases).
235. See generally Mohsen Monash, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing its
Age?, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107 (2014).
236. Id. at 136 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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follow the same deal process norms. 238 As dealmakers have
internalized these norms and followed a checklist which
Delaware has continually emphasized, Delaware has repeatedly
upheld these sale processes, or really lack thereof, as
reasonable. 239 Thus, there is a “give and take” between
dealmakers following norms and Delaware’s continued focus on
a board’s knowledge in lieu of a more robust sales process. 240
Combining this “give and take” with the fact that most
companies include exculpation provisions within their charters
has resulted in a shift back to a basic business judgment
reasonableness standard. 241

238. See, e.g., In re MeadWestvaco S’holders Litig., 168 A.3d 675, 685 (Del.
Ch. 2017) (describing the lead-up to a stock-for-stock transaction in which the
board held “at least six meetings,” hired outside legal and financial advisors,
“received numerous valuations of the Company,” and “asked probing
questions” regarding the potential merger).
239. See cases cited supra note 195 and accompanying text.
240. This “give and take” relationship between dealmakers and Delaware
is analogous to the lawmaking partnership between the United States
Congress and the United States Supreme Court in the context of federal
securities laws, which Professor Jill Fisch has described. See Jill E. Fisch,
Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH.
U. L. REV. 453, 454 (2015) (stating that “it is well documented that Congress
does not exercise exclusive federal lawmaking power. The federal courts play
an important lawmaking role by interpreting federal statutes and creating
interstitial law” (citation omitted)). Professor Fisch describes a collaborative
relationship between Congress and the Court in which the parameters of
private securities fraud litigation have developed. Id. at 469–74. More
specifically, the Court and Congress have engaged in “sequential adjustments”
with Congress adopting “responsive legislation” as a result of the Court’s
lawmaking. Id. at 469–70. Professor Fisch explains that “a lawmaking
partnership is characterized by a common set of policy objectives. This
distinguishes the lawmaking partnership as a common enterprise rather than
two actors that are competing or working at cross-purposes.” Id. at 470. The
relationship between dealmakers and Delaware is similar as the Delaware
courts and dealmakers are not competing entities. Although Delaware is
ensuring the fairness of deals, Delaware is not trying to actively prevent
transactions through its review. If anything, Delaware would like deals to
move forward and close. Perhaps this very sentiment plays a role in Delaware
upholding director’s actions so long as those actions are reasonable and are
taken by non-conflicted directors.
241. See supra Part V.B.
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The New Frontier: Delaware as Deal Arbiter Moving
Forward

To this point, I have focused on the development and
evolution of deal norms from the 1980s through approximately
2015. This is for two reasons. First, the historical approach is
necessary in order to be able to evaluate the interplay between
Delaware and dealmakers with respect to deal norms and to be
able to view the “big picture.” Second, most of the Delaware
cases developing the norms for Revlon and deal protection
devices were decided prior to 2015 and involved pre-closing
challenges to a board’s actions. These cases often resulted in
disclosure-only settlements. In 2015, the Delaware Supreme
Court fundamentally altered deal litigation with its decision in
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings Inc. 242 In that case, the
Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision finding that the
business judgment rule applies to transactions which have been
“approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the
disinterested stockholders.” 243 The Supreme Court made a point
of stating that Unocal and Revlon were really only meant to
provide “injunctive relief to address important M&A decisions
in real time, before closing” and were not “designed with
post-closing money damages claims in mind.” 244
Corwin came shortly after C&J Energy Services. In
reversing the Chancery Court’s grant of an injunction in C&J
Energy Services, the Supreme Court made clear that injunctive
relief should be cautiously employed and only in instances to
“preserve the status quo” until a full trial may occur to
determine if a breach of fiduciary duties has occurred. 245 The
court further clarified that where the stockholders have the
ability to vote no and there is no evidence that stockholders are
inadequately informed or will be coerced into voting for the
transaction, injunctive relief is not a remedy. 246 Then, in 2016,
242. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
243. Id. at 306.
244. Id. at 312.
245. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation
Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1072 (Del. 2014).
246. Id. at 1072–73.
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the Chancery Court issued its decision in In re Trulia
Stockholder Litigation. 247 In that case, the court highly
discouraged
cases
which
result
in
disclosure-only
settlements. 248 Together, Trulia, Corwin, and C&J Energy
Services, dissuade challenges to deal protection devices and a
board’s actions under Revlon. However, it is too early to know
what, if any, impact these cases will have on the deal norms
which have been developed over the previous three decades.
Along these lines, Professors Matthew Cain, Sean Griffith,
Robert Jackson, and Steven Davidoff Solomon address the
continuing vitality of Revlon in a forthcoming paper utilizing a
sample of transactions occurring between 2003 and 2017. 249
Through an empirical analysis of proxy statements, they have
found that Revlon transactions were “more intensely negotiated,
involve[d] more bidders, and result[ed] in higher transaction
premiums than non-Revlon deals.” 250 Although C&J Energy
Services and Corwin came at the tail end of their sampling, they
did not find a substantial impact on deals announced after the
two cases were decided. 251 Indeed, they suggest that dealmakers
who are planning transactions “may respond to norms more
directly than changes in the law, and norms may change more
slowly than law.” 252
So, will the three decades of developed norms change
dramatically? It seems highly unlikely. These deal norms and
processes have been firmly imbedded into dealmakers’
playbooks. Although dealmakers have slowly incorporated more
intricate deal protection devices resulting in a lock-up creep, 253
247. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
248. See id. at 887 (stating that the Chancery Court would be “increasingly
vigilant in scrutinizing the ‘give’ and the ‘get’ of [disclosure only] settlements”).
249. Matthew D. Cain et al., Does Revlon Matter? An Empirical and
Theoretical Study (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 466/2019),
https://perma.cc/KJ52-5ECF (PDF).
250. Id. at 1.
251. See id. at 17 (“Together [C&J Energy Services and Corwin] seem to
restore Revlon to its original factual context: the doctrine remains available
for an intervening bidder seeking an injunction against board conduct in a
competitive bidding situation.”).
252. Id. at 49. They also suggest that it may take longer for dealmakers to
“fully internalize Corwin.” Id.
253. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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Delaware has repeatedly made clear that effective fiduciary
outs must be included in transactions. 254 The lack of an effective
fiduciary out is exactly the type of egregious behavior that the
Delaware Supreme Court suggests would be proper grounds for
seeking and obtaining injunctive relief under C&J Energy
Services. 255 With respect to Revlon, it has already been
diminished to a reasonableness standard with various types of
sale processes satisfying the duty to maximize shareholder
value. 256 Delaware has repeatedly made clear that it would only
step in if there was evidence of director conflict or of bidders not
being treated fairly. Delaware will continue to be a deal arbiter
by policing behavior and deal terms which are out of line with
deal norms and by further setting norms by commenting on
behavior that may not be a violation, but which may fall short
of Delaware’s expectations.
VI. Conclusion
For decades, Delaware has been the ultimate arbiter in
M&A conflicts in every sense of the word. Not only does
Delaware act as an arbiter in the traditional sense of the term,
reviewing the legality of sales processes and contractual
provisions, but Delaware is the ultimate originator of deal
norms. One cannot ignore the symbiotic relationship between
dealmakers and Delaware when considering the development
and evolution of deal norms. 257 That is, dealmakers invent and
transform deal structures and contractual provisions,
particularly deal protection devices. After some time passes,
Delaware has the opportunity to review these innovations. 258
Initially, in the 1980s, while reviewing leveraged and hostile
transactions, Delaware announced stricter scrutiny standards
254. See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL
2931180 at *8 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (noting the importance of a meaningful
fiduciary out provision).
255. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
256. See supra Part V.B.
257. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (describing the “give and
take” relationship between dealmakers and Delaware).
258. See Rock, supra note 88, at 1095 (describing the significance of the
time lag between when deals are made and when courts review those deals).
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beyond the business judgment rule. 259 It also provided
significant commentary on the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the process
which should be followed in selling a company as well as what
types of deal protection devices may pass muster. 260 These “do’s”
and “don’ts” act as obligational norms in the deal context. The
story, however, does not end there. As dealmakers comply with
these norms, two things occur. One is that dealmakers begin to
push the envelope ever so slightly with respect to deal protection
devices. 261 When Delaware reviews those somewhat enhanced
devices, they tend to uphold the devices as they are in line with
the market and with the norms. Second, when Delaware reviews
board actions taken during the sale process, Delaware will
generally not take issue with those actions so long as they are
largely in compliance with the norms that have been set forth
over time. 262 This complicity in the review of both deal
protection devices and board conduct results in an erosion of
stricter scrutiny standards to a reasonableness standard.

259. See supra Part III.
260. See Manning, supra note 122, at 3 (compiling a list of Delaware’s
“do’s” and “don’ts”).
261. See supra Part V.
262. See supra Part V.

